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TOWARD INCENTIVE-BASED PROCEDURE: THREE
APPROACHES FOR REGULATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
E. Donald Elliott*
[W]e should think about civil procedure less from the perspective of powers
granted to judges and more from the perspective of incentives created for
lawyers and clients.1
The problem to be discussed is hardly the most important facing the law
today. Expert testimony about technical and scientific issues is presented in
a relatively small percentage of cases. 2 It plays a central role in an even
smaller proportion: for example, in toxic torts, medical malpractice, and
occasionally in criminal cases in which new forensic techniques are offered
as evidence.
The management of expert testimony on scientific and technical issues in
litigation is of special interest, however, on two different levels. First, law at
the frontiers of science and technology challenges our ingenuity to adapt
traditional judicial procedures to controversies far removed from those for
which they were developed.3 Many commentators believe that case-by-case
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The author's personal experience in toxic
tort litigation is from a defense perspective as Special Litigation Counsel, Corporate
Environmental Programs, General Electric Company. The views expressed in this
paper are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of any organization or
group. It should be noted that General Electric was a defendant in at least one of the
cases cited hereinafter, In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 706 F. Supp. 358
(E.D. Pa. 1988).
1 Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
306, 308 (1986).
2 See, e.g., Schroeder, The Forensic Sciences in American Criminal Justice: A
Legal Study Concerning the Florensic Science Personnel, (undated), cited in M.
SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
IN LITIGATION 8 (1980) (noting that nearly one quarter of the lawyers and judges
responding encountered some form of scientific evidence in at least half of their
criminal cases).
3 See Elliott, Science Panels in Toxic Tort Litigation: Why We Don't Use Them, in
ICET SYMPOSIUM III IMMUNOTOXICOLOGY: FROM LAB TO LAW 115 (1987).
It is important to remember, however, that when we speak of the "facts" at issue
in toxic tort litigation we are talking about issues of a very different sort than
those that our traditional litigation procedures were developed to resolve. Tradi-
tionally, common law litigation turned on issues of historical fact-what Profes-
sor Alexander Bickel used to call "who struck John" issues-and issues of
credibility were left to the common sense ofjuries. Although traditional jury trial
procedures may be well suited to resolving issues of this type, it is questionable
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litigation before lay judges and juries is not the best way to resolve scientific
and technical controversies; 4 however, absent reforms to substitute other
institutions for traditional adjudication, 5 judges must struggle to improve
procedures for handling technical matters as best they can. In the meantime,
the courts' ability to handle controversies about scientific and technical facts
does have a major effect on verdicts and settlements in areas such as toxic
torts, products liability, and medical malpractice. 6 Practical results in these
fields are more likely to be influenced by the evidentiary rulings on innova-
tive theories of fact than by substantive law. Consequently, the problem of
how to manage scientific and technical expert testimony is important in its
own right, particularly in discrete areas of law.
But I am interested in the problem of scientific testimony for a second,
more general, reason. I use this issue as a concrete illustration of a general
approach to procedural reform that I call incentive-based procedure. The
whether traditional courtroom litigation procedures are equally appropriate for
resolving issues of toxicology and epidemiology which arise in toxic tort cases.
By their very nature, disciplines such as toxicology rely on specialized tech-
niques that run counter to a lay person's intuitions .... A scientific "fact" is not
a fact in the same sense that "who struck John" is a fact. As Kuhn [T. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970)] reminds us, a
scientific "fact" is essentially the consensus judgment of a specialized commu-
nity. It is highly doubtful, however, that our present procedures in toxic tort
litigation give juries an accurate picture of the consensus judgment of the
scientific community on technical and scientific issues.
Id. at 117-18.
4 See Elliott, Goal Analysis versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation
Systems, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1372-75 (1985) (recommending that other institutions,
such as the legislature or administrative agencies, should be used to address most
toxic compensation claims); see also Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 307-14
(1985) (favoring expert administrative agencies); Huber, The Bhopalization of U.S.
Tort Law, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Fall, 1985, at 73, 79; Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science,
Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence, 68 A.B.A. J. 1094, 1098-1100
(1982); Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for
Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REv. 489, 559-60 (1981).
1 My own preference is not to substitute other institutions for courts but to develop
"hybrids" that capitalize on the advantages of courts and alternative procedures. See
infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
6 Elsewhere I have expressed the opinion that the decisions of juries in toxic tort
cases are seldom based solely on medical or scientific "facts" relating to whether
chemical exposure can be proved to have caused the plaintiff's injuries; the per-
ceived blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct is likely to play a larger role in
verdicts. See Elliott, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 799,
801-02 (1985). Nonetheless medical and scientific testimony does play an important
role in determining which cases get to juries, and technical issues of causation are not
entirely irrelevant to the size of jury verdicts.
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central idea, summarized in the epigraph, is that we should think of rules of
procedure not only as grants of discretionary powers to judges but also as
establishing the framework within which lawyers make strategic decisions.7
If we wish to change the behavior of litigants with regard to subjects such as
discovery, delay, or the use of experts, we must structure our procedural
system so that the incentives it creates regulate conduct by litigants in most
cases without the need for discretionary judicial intervention.8 We can
effectively change behavior in litigation only by creating appropriate incen-
tives ex ante, not by first stimulating problems through perverse incentives
and then trying to correct them ex post through discretionary judicial polic-
ing or sanctions.9
I. THE PROBLEM OF MARGINAL SCIENCE: CLINICAL ECOLOGY
Before examining the relative merits of various means of regulating scien-
tific testimony in litigation, I illustrate the nature of the problem by consider-
ing the strategic role that "clinical ecology" plays in toxic tort litigation. The
willingness of courts to accept expert testimony from a small group of
professional witnesses who call themselves "clinical ecologists" -even
though the medical establishment has explicitly repudiated their views as
unscientific'°-has dramatically changed the strategic balance in toxic tort
cases. Only a few years ago, most lawyers knowledgeable in the field of toxic
torts thought that it would be next to impossible to win chemical exposure
I The principal drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example,
conceived of the rules as "enabling grants" that confer various powers on trialjudges. See Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 496 (1950).
S Cf. Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG.
317, 346 (1987) ("The essential defining characteristic of regulation is that while
preserving nominal freedom of individuals to make private decisions, regulation
attempts to alter the course of decisions in the aggregate by altering the structure of
incentives individuals face when making their decisions.").
I For a general argument that judges should view legal rules from an ex ante rather
than an ex post perspective, see Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Eco-
nomic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 10-12 (1984). Analyzing legal rules in terms of
the incentives they create is an approach that is more firmly established in other areas
of the law than it is in procedure; nonetheless, some previous work recognizes the
incentives created by particular procedural rules. See, e.g., Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399,
400 (1973); Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92
YALE L.J. 352, 360-61 (1982) (authored by John K. Setear).
1o See generally California Medical Association Scientific Board Task Force on
Clinical Ecology, Clinical Ecology-A Critical Appraisal, 144 W.J. MED. 239 (1986);
see also Marshall, Immune System Theories on Trial, 234 SCIENCE 1490 (1986).
1989]
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cases under traditional principles of tort law." Unless exposure to a toxic
substance causes a disease with virtually no other known causes, 2 conven-
tional science generally cannot support the showing traditionally required by
tort law-that it is more likely than not that a particular plaintiff's illness
was caused by exposure to a particular substance.13
Testimony from clinical ecologists has effectively overruled this require-
ment, dramatically changing the balance of advantage between plaintiffs and
defendants in toxic tort cases. For a price,' 4 some clinical ecologists will
testify that exposure to even very small amounts of a wide range of chemi-
cals suppresses the immune system, thereby weakening the body's ability to
ward off disease. This weakening, in turn, allegedly makes the plaintiff
vulnerable to virtually all diseases known to humankind, including "ner-
vousness," "malaise," and other conditions that present only subjective
symptoms.' 5 Conventional scientists generally reject the opinions of clinical
11 See Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom
Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 920-28 (1981) (describing the many legal obstacles
to collecting damages for toxic torts, such as the statute of limitations, proof of
causation, and the high cost of litigation); Udall, Toxic Chemicals and Radiation, 38
MERCER L. REV. 511, 518 (1987) (discussing the difficulties in demonstrating that
radiation causes cancer); see also SUPERFUND SECTION 301(e) STUDY GROUP, 97TH
CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS
AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES-A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE
WITH SECTION 301(e) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COM-
PENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (P.L. 96-510) 81-115 (Comm. Print 1982)
[hereinafter SUPERFUND SECTION 301(e) STUDY GROUP].
12 For a description of the factors that determine whether conventional science can
relate diseases to particular chemical exposures, see Elliott, supra note 4, at 1369-
72. See also Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52
FORDHAM L. REv. 732, 753-60 (1984). Recently, the term "signature diseases" has
been coined to describe a few diseases, such as mesothelioma following asbestos
exposure, that can be readily traced to chemical exposure because they have vir-
tually no other known causes. For a discussion of causation in "signature disease"
cases, see Abraham & Merrill, Scientific Uncertainty in the Courts, ISSUES SCI. &
TECH., Winter, at 93, 101 (1986); Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219,
1251-53 (1987).
13 See P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
100-05 (1988); Gordis, Epidemiologic Approaches for Studying Human Diseases in
Relation to Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 25 Hous. L. REV. 837, 847 (1988); see
also Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating
the traditional rule).
1 The "going rate" for one of the most active of these witnesses, Bertram
Carnow, is reportedly $20,000 per plaintiff.
" See, e.g., Science and Toxic Tort Law: Novel Strategies in the Woburn Litiga-
tion, 1 Toxic L. REP. (BNA) 374 (1986).
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ecologists, question their methods, and emphasize the natural variability and
reserve capacity of the human immune system. 6
Despite its status as a "junk" science, clinical ecology has become in-
creasingly important in toxic tort litigation because it gives plaintiffs' law-
yers important strategic and economic advantages. The economic value of a
toxic tort case to a plaintiff's attorney is a function of the number of
claimants in the case.17 If a plaintiff's lawyer bases her case on conventional
science, the number of claimants who can be joined in the suit is limited to
the small subset of exposed persons who actually suffer from particular
diseases that the chemical in question has been shown to be capable of
causing in animal tests or epidemiological studies. If, however, courts are
willing to admit "expert" testimony from ecologists, the plaintiff's lawyer
can probably reach the jury on behalf of everyone who was (or conceivably
might have been) exposed to the substance. A clinical ecologist will testify
that whatever happens to ail the plaintiffs, from asthma to cancer, was
probably caused by chemically-induced suppression of their immune sys-
tems.
A concrete example clarifies the practical importance of this difference.
Suppose a landfill is leaking TCE (trichloroethylene), a common industrial
chemical used for decreasing metal parts before electroplating them. Sup-
pose further that 300 people live close enough to the landfill that they could
have been exposed to trace amounts of the chemical through well water.
Recent animal studies suggest that TCE may increase slightly the rate of
certain types of cancer, but there are great difficulties in translating these
high-dose experiments in animals to low-dose exposure in humans. It is
likely that, among the 300 neighbors of the landfill, no more than one or two
persons will have the kinds of cancer that TCE allegedly causes. There may
be no cases at all.18 Using arguments grounded in conventional science, a
plaintiff's attorney can sue for personal injuries on behalf of the one or two
people with cancer and, perhaps, for fear of cancer or enhanced risk of
cancer on behalf of the others. 9 If the plaintiff's lawyer chooses to take the
16 Both the American Academy of Allergy and Immunology and the California
Medical Association have issued official statements repudiating clinical ecology as
unscientific. See Marshall, supra note 10, at 1491; see also Immune System Theories
on Trial, 234 SCIENCE 1490, 1491 (1986).
17 The "going rate" for settlements is $10,000 to $100,000 per plaintiff.
18 It is important to understand that studies proving that a chemical causes a
particular disease, such as cancer, do not establish that everyone who was exposed
to the chemical will contract the disease; rather, such works establish that their risk
of getting the disease is somewhat increased. See generally S. EPSTEIN, THE POLI-
TICS OF CANCER 3 (1978); Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 12, at 762 n.126.
19 Some courts have permitted awards for the future risk of developing cancer if
the plaintiff could demonstrate that his risk was greater than 50%. See, e.g., Jackson
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413-15 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert.
1989]
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clinical ecology route, however, the claim will be much more valuable.
Under a clinical ecology theory, the complaint can allege damages not only
for the cancers but also for whatever else happens to be wrong with all 300
people living near the landfill-from kidney disease and chronic lower back
pain to frequent colds, depression, and sexual dysfunction. The theory will
be that low level exposure to chemicals suppressed the victims' immune
systems and caused every one of these injuries. From a purely economic
perspective, the clinical ecology witness offers his lawyer employer a larger
return on investment than his conventional science counterparts.
Testimony by clinical ecologists also provides distinct advantages at trial.
The most effective among this group of witnesses use the term "chemical
AIDS" to describe their theory,20 thereby subtly linking in the jury's mind
two modern nightmares: contamination by toxic chemicals and acquired-
immune deficiency syndrome ("AIDS"). These tactics have produced sev-
eral multi-million dollar jury verdicts and numerous large settlements.21
Resolving whether "clinical ecologists" are really misunderstood
geniuses who, like Galileo and Semmelweis, are persecuted by the scientific
establishment because they are generations ahead of their time, or merely
charlatans who will testify to anything for a buck, is beyond the scope of this
paper. The point is not to condemn clinical ecologists or other experts-for-
hire; some are probably sincere in their conclusions. The point is rather that
our current system of litigation creates strong incentives for lawyers to
select experts with views outside the mainstream of scientific opinion. I have
analyzed the nature of these incentives elsewhere in detail; but for present
purposes suffice it to say that the current system "extends equal dignity to
the opinions of charlatans and Nobel Prize winners, with only a lay jury to
distinguish between the two." '2 2 As a result, lawyers are driven to select
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). In another case, the same court upheld an award for a
plaintiff's fear of getting cancer even though there was no proof of a "medical
probability" that he would actually develop the disease. Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp.,
765 F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 1985).
20 Compare Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 212-14 (Mo. App. 1988) (hold-
ing use of the term "chemically induced AIDS" improper but otherwise endorsing
clinical ecology) with Sterling v. Velsicol, 855 F.2d 1188, 1208-09 (6th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting clinical ecology theories).
21 See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 2 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 862
(1988) (awarding $3.9 million for fear and punitive damages to four former residents
of an area located near a leaking landfill); Kemner v. Monsanto, 2 Toxic L. Rep.
(BNA) 612 (1987) (awarding $16.25 million in punitive damages for failing to elimi-
nate dioxin as a by-product and failing to warn the public of its harmful effects);
Marshall, supra note 10, at 1490 (reporting settlements of $19 million and $8 million).
22 Elliott, supra note 3, at 117. Our reliance on layjuries to assess the credibility of
technical experts is not a problem, of course, if one is willing to assume that
something magical happens in the jury room so that ordinary people can suddenly
unravel complex technical and scientific issues that would baffle the rest of us.
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experts from the extremes on the assumption that the jury will guess that the
truth lies somewhere between the two.
Abuse of expert testimony for hire is not the exclusive province of plain-
tiffs.2 3 Judge Weinstein recently summed up the more general problem of
expert testimony in toxic tort cases:
[An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual
theory, no matter how frivolous, thus validating the case sufficiently to
avoid summary judgment and forcing the matter to trial. At the trial
itself, an expert's testimony can be used to obfuscate what would
otherwise be a simple case. ... Juries and judges can be, and some-
times are, misled by such experts-for-hire.2 4
II. APPROACH ONE: JUDICIAL EXCLUSION
The primary means of addressing a broad range of problems in our con-
temporary procedural system is ad hoc discretionary control by judges.25
For example, our system of civil procedure delegates enormous discovery
power to lawyers and then seeks to control potential abuses by giving judges
discretionary powers to issue protective orders and impose sanctions.
The discretionary judicial control philosophy is expressed in the area of
scientific and technical testimony by what we may call the judicial exclusion
strategy. Traditionally, the law's main line of defense against misleading
scientific and technical testimony was the judge's power to screen what the
jury may consider.2 6 There are three different versions of the judicial
exclusion or "screening" approach.27 The first version is the "Frye"
23 Recently a prominent defense witness-who reportedly received $277,000 for
testifying over a five-year period on behalf of A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the
Dalkon Shield-was indicted for perjury as a result of alleged inconsistencies in his
testimony. See Shennon, Professor Is Charged With Lying For Maker of Birth
Control Device, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
24 J. Weinstein, Role of Expert Testimony and Novel Scientific Evidence in Proof
of Causation 12 (Aug. 9, 1987) (address before the ABA Annual Meeting).
25 See generally Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982); Cover,
For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J.
718 (1975).
26 Professor Paul Rothstein and Michael Crew coined the term "screening" to
describe the judicial exclusion strategy. Rothstein & Crew, When Should the Judge
Keep Expert Testimony from the Jury?, 1 INSIDE LITIGATION 19 (1987). In 1987,
Rothstein and Crew described the "screening strategy" for controlling expert tes-
timony as a minority approach but one which was gaining adherents.
27 Professor Schwartz's suggestion that my approach is equivalent to that of the
"screeners" is nonsense. See Schwartz, There is No Archbishop of Science: A
Comment on Elliott's Toward Incentive Based Procedure: Three Approaches Jbr
Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 517 (1989). Unlike the "screeners," I
believe that courts should permit minority views that have even marginal scientific
1989]
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rule. 8 Formerly, this approach dominated legal thinking, but it is currently
in decline. Two new variants have arisen to take its place. One new variant
of the judicial exclusion strategy was pioneered by Judge Weinstein in the
Agent Orange litigation. This approach uses summary judgment to exclude
expert testimony that fails to meet minimal standards of trustworthiness and
credibility.2 9 The third judicial exclusion strategy, recently suggested by
several commentators, would amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to bring
back a revised version of the Frye test for admissibility.3 0 While there are
subtle differences between these three techniques, they share many of the
same drawbacks-drawbacks inherent in the judicial exclusion or "screen-
ing" strategy as a technique for regulating litigants' practices.
A. The Frye Rule
In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit decided in Frye v. United States that testimony regarding novel
scientific and technical issues could only be introduced if the principles
underlying the testimony "have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.' 31 Many state and federal courts were applying this
so-called Frye rule when the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in
1975.32 Recently, however, courts have tended to reject or modify Frye on
the grounds that it is "at odds with the spirit, if not the precise language, of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, ' 33 which generally encourage admitting
support to go to the jury-not Screen them out-but with a clear indication that
mainstream science disagrees. In my view, judges should only exclude expert tes-
timony when it is so patently unsubstantiated that it does not qualify as science at all.
My approach is not to withhold minority opinion from the jury (as advocated by the
real "screeners") but, instead, to admit minority opinion and, at the same time, to
give the jury an accurate picture of how that opinion fits into the overall distribution
of scientific opinion on the subject.
28 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), discussed infra at notes
31-37 and accompanying text.
29 See In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1245 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2598 (1988).
30 See, e.g., Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1987)
(presenting, various proposals to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also
infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
31 Frye, 293 F. dit 1014.
32 Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States
A Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1203-06 (1980).
33 United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3rd Cir. 1985); see also United
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding the Frye test inade-
quate to determine the admissibility of offered scientific evidence), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 702[02],
at 702-36 (1988) (stating that "[e]limination of the Frye test is consistent with the
underlying policies of Article VII").
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expert testimony whenever it would be helpful to the jury.3 4
The Frye rule has been criticized on both practical and theoretical
grounds. Frye is admittedly a "conservative approach ' 35 that precludes
courts from admitting potentially relevant testimony until the underlying
scientific theory or technique achieves acceptance within the scientific
community.3 6 A good case can be made, however, that the rule has served
the judicial system well.3 7 There is very little that the courts have kept out
under Frye that, in retrospect, should have been admitted.3 8
Frye puts judges, who are not known for their scientific literacy, in the
unfortunate position of appearing to rule on the validity of scientific theories.
At least in principle, the courts are not really attempting to determine for
themselves whether particular scientific theories are correct; rather, they are
asking whether theories have achieved a minimum level of acceptance by the
scientific community. Application of the Frye approach presents a number of
practical difficulties, however. First, which "principle" must be accepted
before admitting testimony-the specific tenet or the broader scientific prin-
ciple upon which it is based? That the laws of Newtonian physics are
generally accepted does not mean that testimony by an "accidentologist"
who applies these laws to a particular accident should necessarily be admit-
ted. Second, how should the court define the relevant "community of
scientists" which it looks to in gauging acceptability?
Clinical ecology provides an illustration of these two problems. Arguably,
evidence based on clinical ecology could pass the Frye test with flying colors
even though it has been officially repudiated by at least two professional
societies.3 9 Two "principles" that might be said to underlie clinical ecology
are: (1) that certain chemicals suppress the immune system and (2) that a
suppressed immune system is less effective in fighting off disease. At this
level of generality, virtually no scientist would disagree; it is the application
34 See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
35 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
36 For examples of the types of testimony that have been excluded under Frye, see
Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the
Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REv. 554, 557 (1982-83).
37 See Spaeth, Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules on Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence: A Judge's Perspective, 115 F.R.D. 112, 118-20 (1987); Starrs,
Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal
Evidence Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 92, 94 (1987); Giannelli, In Defense of Frye, 99
F.R.D. 202, 202 (1983).
38 See Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 595,
636-49 (1988).
39 See supra note 16.
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of these valid general principles that conyentional scientists dispute. But
Frye has very little to say about how valid general principles are applied to
particular circumstances.
Another difficulty encountered in trying to apply Frye is that there is no
single "scientific community"; there are many different sub-communities.
How should a court determine which "particular field" of science must have
generally accepted the theory for it to be admissible under Frye? Suppose
that clinical ecologists start their own professional society and journal; does
their agreement with one another amount to acceptance "in the particular
field"? Courts have struggled to develop answers to these questions, but
however they are answered, Frye remains a blunt, imperfect instrument for
assessing the reliability of scientific testimony. The root of the problem is
that one cannot reduce what constitutes "good science" to a simple formula
that judges, who generally know nothing about science, can apply.
B. Summary Judgment: Agent Orange
Frye is but one variant of the judicial exclusion or "screening" strategy
for dealing with scientific and technical testimony. An alternative approach
that has gained prominence recently is for the court to grant a motion in
limine excluding expert testimony as immaterial or lacking adequate founda-
tion as a matter of law and then to grant summary judgment. 40 Rather than
focusing on whether the testifying expert's principles are accepted by the
scientific community (as Frye does), this approach measures the criteria
used by an expert in forming her conclusions against the standards of
substantive law. Judge Weinstein used this general approach in granting
summary judgment against the'plaintiffs who opted-out of the $180 million
class settlement in Agent Orange to pursue their individual claims.
41
40 See J. Weinstein, supra note 24, at 30-31 (footnotes omitted):
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, ajudge can exclude expert testimony and
thus grant summary judgment in one of two ways. First there is Rule 703, which
allows an expert to base his opinion on the type of evidence reasonably relied
upon by experts in his field. In some cases examination of the basis of an
expert's opinion reveals that it is supported by no reliable evidence at all. In such
cases exclusion of the expert's opinion under Rule 703 and a grant of summary
judgment to the opposing party might be appropriate. In other cases, an expert's
opinion is supported by some credible evidence, but further investigation reveals
that there is other, much more persuasive evidence available which undermines
the expert's opinion and which the expert is ignoring. In these cases, the court
might exclude the expert's testimony either under Rule 702, as not being helpful
to the trier of fact, or under Rule 403, as being likely to mislead the jury.
See also Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REv.
577 (1986). For a recent case that applies these approaches, see In re Paoli Railroad
Yard PCB Litigation, 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (excluding testimony of
plaintiffs' experts and granting summary judgment in 24 PCB personal injury cases),
appeals filed Nos. 88-1973 to 88-1992, 89-1070 to 89-1079, and 89-1097.
41 In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1242-43.
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In Agent Orange, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
issue of causation relied primarily on a series of government epidemiological
studies that found no significant correlation between exposure to Agent
Orange and injuries similar to those of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs responded
with long, carefully-drafted affidavits from several experts. At least some of
these affidavits used a version of the traditional "magic formula" for expert
medical testimony: in the expert's opinion, with reasonable medical cer-
tainty, the plaintiffs' injuries were caused by exposure to Agent Orange. 42
The mere existence of such an affidavit stating an expert's opinion on the
ultimate issue of causation had been regarded by most courts as sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment and to send a case to trial.
Judge Weinstein went behind the concluding paragraph of the expert
affidavits, however, to analyze the basis for the expert's conclusory opinions
and found them insufficient as a matter of law. He noted, inter alia, that
while experts stated general conclusions on causation, these conclusions
were guarded; the experts merely opined that many of the plaintiffs' com-
plaints were "consistent with" afflictions that had been attributed to Agent
Orange in the literature; they stopped short of opining that Agent Orange had
actually caused the plaintiffs' problems. Judge Weinstein also emphasized
that the plaintiffs' experts failed to consider and exclude other known causes
for the health problems they attributed to Agent Orange (a process which
doctors call "differential diagnosis"). 4 3 Based on these and related deficien-
cies, Judge Weinstein concluded that the affidavit's "conclusory allegations
[on the ultimate issue of causation] lack any foundation in fact. .. [and are]
so guarded as to be worthless. ' 44 Judge Weinstein therefore excluded the
expert affidavits as inadmissible and, finding no other evidence in the record
sufficient to support a conclusion that Agent Orange had caused the plain-
tiffs' health problems, granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment. The Second Circuit recently affirmed Judge Weinstein's disposition of
the Agent Orange case, but on an alternative ground, without endorsing his
reasoning in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 45
42 See id. at 1237 (affidavit of Dr. Singer, concluding that "it is my opinion to a
reasonable degree of medical probability (that is, more likely than not) that the
medical difficulties described by the affiants were proximately caused by exposure to
Agent Orange").
43 In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 706 F. Supp. at 369-70 (excluding
testimony by a toxicologist inter alia because she was not trained in differential
diagnosis).
11 Id. at 1238 (regarding Dr. Singer's affidavit); see also id. at 1239 (stating that
"[a]t most [Dr. Epstein's affidavits] collectively have the probative force of a scintilla
of evidence").
" In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 174 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Adams v. United States, !08 S. Ct. 695 (1988).
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Judge Weinstein's approach in Agent Orange may have been sound but, in
general, summary judgment is of only limited value as a technique for
controlling expert testimony. Essentially, Judge Weinstein's methodology
treats the experts' affidavits as pleadings and finds them defective, as a
matter of form, for failing to allege the elements required for a finding of
causation in tort.
The proper objection to Judge Weinstein's approach is not that he went
too far by subjecting the experts' affidavits to a hostile, legalistic reading, but
that he could not go far enough. As a practical matter, experts' affidavits in a
case such as Agent Orange are drafted by counsel. If the affidavit does not
contain a definitive opinion that the chemical caused a particular disease but
merely states that symptoms are "consistent with" what has been reported
in the literature, the difference is undoubtedly significant. The expert would
have gone the extra mile if she could have.
Judge Weinstein's approach is flawed not because it scrutinizes the ex-
perts' conclusions too closely but because it does not go far enough. Ulti-
mately, summary judgment cannot probe the expert's credibility or the
scientific validity of her reasoning. The judge is restricted to detecting
whether the expert's affidavit "covers all the bases" as a matter of form.
Summary judgment really tests the skill of the lawyer who drafted the
affidavit, not the trustworthiness of the expert's testimony.
The first time that a Judge Weinstein delves more deeply in scrutinizing
expert affidavits than most judges have traditionally gone, he may catch
lawyers by surprise. But in future cases, on similar facts, it will be relatively
easy to correct the flaws in affidavit-drafting that Judge Weinstein found fatal
in Agent Orange. If the Agent Orange experts had examined the medical
records of individual plaintiffs (and perhaps conducted some group inter-
views to exclude alternative causes), they could have expressed an opinion
based on "clinical judgment" that chemical exposure was the most likely
cause of the plaintiffs' maladies. This is precisely the approach that clinical
ecologists are adopting in the wake of Agent Orange .46
In an important recent decision, Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. ,'47 the D.C. Circuit announced a rule that may tend to preclude experts
from basing their testimony on unsubstantiated opinions that run contrary to
"a wealth of published epidemiological data." '48 This decision is clearly
correct in principle. An expert scientific witness is not admitted to testify to
46 Levin, Environmental Illness: A Scientific Reality, A Legal Boondoggle, A
Potential American Tragedy Proceedings, in ICET SYMPOSIUM III IMMUNO-
TOXICOLOGY: FROM LAB TO LAW 88 (1987).
47 Richardson v. Richardson-Merell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832-33 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(upholding judgment n.o.v. for defendant in a Bendectin case on the ground that the
district court properly excluded conclusions by the plaintiff's expert as contrary to a
substantial body of published epidemiological literature).
48 Id. at 832.
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his or her personal beliefs and opinions; rather, the philosophy of expert
testimony is that science itself is testifying through a particular expositor of a
discipline. The only proper focus of an expert witness, therefore, is on the
collective views of a scientific discipline as perceived by a person trained in
the methods and conclusions of that discipline. At some point, a scientist
who testifies to personal opinions that have no support in the methods of the
discipline is going beyond his proper role as an expert and should not be
permitted to testify. On the other hand, practical application of the
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. approach brings judges perilously
close to deciding which scientific views are valid and which are not. This is a
task for which judges and courts are clearly unsuited.
The deeper underlying issue in decisions such as Agent Orange and
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. is whether summary judgment can
play an important role in toxic tort cases, or whether the mere presence of a
trained expert willing to pronounce formulaic conclusions will suffice to
force cases to the jury. It would be desirable for summary judgment to play
an important role in toxic tort cases, particularly in light of the recent
Celotex decision49 in which the Supreme Court encouraged wider use of
summary judgment to dispose of meritless cases. 50 Summary judgment can
be used to dispose of cases where there is evidence that plaintiffs were not
exposed to significant amounts of a chemical. 51 Summary judgment is not a
very useful tool for probing conflicting scientific judgments, however.
C. Neo-Frye Rules
While the trend of decisions is against Frye, commentators have begun to
warn of the dangers of admitting expert testimony on scientific matters
without any check on trUstworthiness. 52 This has led to a series of proposals
to "reinvent" Frye. In 1986, an ABA committee of Science and Technology
produced four versions of an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence to
revise and reinvigorate Frye .53 Professor Frederic Lederer suggested amend-
49 Celotex Co. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
50 Id. at 323-24.
51 For example, where tests for body burdens show that a group of plaintiffs have
no more of a chemical in their bodies than the normal background level for the
population as a whole, courts should grant summary judgment, absent some legiti-
mate dispute about the validity of the tests or rates of bio-elimination. Whatever else
the causation requirement in tort may mean, plaintiffs should at least be required to
prove that they have been exposed to the offending substance in a way that distin-
guishes them from the general population.
52 See, e.g., Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of
Preliminar' Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 577 (1984); Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An
Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1984).
. Proposals for a Model Rule on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115
F.R.D. 79,.84-145 (1987).
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ing Rule 702 to require a finding that scientific evidence is "reliable." 54
Professor Margaret Berger would allow testimony "about a scientific princi-
ple or other technique that has not previously been accorded judicial recog-
nition" only "if the court determines that its probative value outweighs the
dangers specified in Rule 403.' 55 Professor James Staffs would require a
finding that the "scientific theory or technique" upon which expert tes-
timony is based is "scientifically valid. ' 56 Professor Paul Giannelli would
leave the substance of the rules unchanged but would require parties who
intend to rely on scientific evidence to give advance written notice of their
intent to allow opposing parties to file a motion in limine.57
Whatever the respective technical merits or demerits of the various pro-
posals, they share the common premise that the main line of defense should
be a preliminary inquiry by the court to ensure that scientific evidence meets
minimal standards of trustworthiness as a precondition for admitting it.
Hence, we may group these four proposals together as examples of "neo-
Frye" approaches to the problem of scientific testimony. Another version of
the neo-Frye approach was employed in United States v. Downing,5 8 in
which the Third Circuit rejected the Frye test and substituted a more flexi-
ble, balancing test for admissibility.
Such proposals all follow the basic approach of Frye but seek to improve
the substantive test that courts apply in screening scientific testimony for
admissibility. Neo-Frye rules may ameliorate some of the difficulties and
ambiguities that courts have encountered in administering Frye, but they
cannot surmount the more basic problems inherent in employing the judicial
exclusion or "screening" strategy as a means of controlling expert tes-
timony.
Ultimately, the judicial exclusion strategy is limited by two factors. First,
it must be applied by judges, who know very little about the underlying
merits of the scientific controversies at issue. Second, for judges to have any
control over the admission of the testimony, there must be a flaw in the
expert's testimony so gross that total exclusion of the testimony is war-
ranted. These two requirements limit the usefulness of the judicial exclusion
strategy to particularly clear abuses (or to situations that the courts can be
54 Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 115 F.R.D. 84,
85 (1987).
11 Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 89,
89-91 (1987).
5 See Starrs, supra note 37, at 97-99.
57 Giannelli, Scientific'Evidence: A Proposed Amendment to Federal Ride 702, 115
F.R.D. 102, 103 (1987).
58 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting the Frye test as a "conservative
approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence that is at odds with the spirit, if
not the precise language, of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
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made to perceive as particularly clear abuses). There are undoubtedly many
hypothetical cases-and surely some real world cases-in which judicial
exclusion is appropriate. But judicial exclusion merely scratches the surface.
Many more abuses of scientific expertise in litigation will pass muster under
any imaginable judicial exclusion approach than will be weeded out of the
process.
III. APPROACH Two: INFORMATION ENHANCEMENT
The inherent limitations of the judicial exclusion approach have stimulated
a search for alternatives that might reach more subtle abuses of scientific
expertise. The traditional alternative to the judicial exclusion strategy for
controlling testimony by technical experts has been the information en-
hancement approach. The basic idea is that rather than-or, in addition
to-limiting the admissibility of information offered by the parties, the court
should obtain additional information from "neutral" sources to assist the
jury in evaluating the experts' testimony. I consider here three versions of
the information enhancement strategy: court-appointed experts, science
panels, and administrative-court hybrids.
A. Court-Appointed Experts
The idea that courts should appoint neutral experts to aid the jury in
evaluating testimony of partisan experts is not new in American civil proce-
dure. In 1901, for example, Judge Learned Hand advocated advisory panels
of experts as the solution to the battle of experts for hire." Since that time,
numerous judges and commentators have endorsed the concept of court-
appointed experts.60 Despite the virtual consensus that court-appointed ex-
perts should be used more frequently, they rarely are. 61 Why judges so rarely
appoint "impartial" experts remains a mystery. It is not because they lack
the power. "The inherent power of a trial judge to appoint an expert of his
own choosing is virtually unquestioned" 2 and is also codified in Rule 706 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 63 the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Model
Expert Testimony Act),6 4 and the rules of most states.
'9 Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40, 56 (1901).
60 See, e.g., Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Experts,
29 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (1956).
61 See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 33, at 706[01], 706-8 to -12
(Supp. 1988); Botter, The Court Appointed Impartial Expert, in USING EXPERTS IN
CIVIL CASES 53, 58 & n.17 (M. Kraft 2d ed. 1982).
62 Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. EviD. 706.
63 FED. R. EVID. 706.
64 UNIF. R. EvID. 706, 13 U.L.A. 319 (1974).
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One commentator has pointed out that a judge can be reversed if she does
appoint a neutral expert but not if she refuses to appoint one. 6 That dispar-
ity, while real, probably does not explain judges' reluctance to appoint
neutral experts. In the first place, the risks of reversal are not great either
way. In any event, few trial judges are so concerned about the possibility of
appellate reversal that they would hesitate to act if they felt that a court-
appointed expert would make a substantial contribution.
Another suggested explanation for judicial reluctance to appoint neutral
experts is the fear that the court-appointed expert's opinion will unduly
influence the jury's determination. There is some anecdotal evidence sup-
porting this concern but it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which juries are
swayed by expert testimony, even by court-appointed experts. 66 One study
showed that juries returned verdicts consistent with the court-appointed
expert's opinion in only twelve out of nineteen cases, or approximately
sixty-three percent of the time. 67 These limited data suggest thatjuries do not
feel compelled to adopt the court-appointed expert's position.68
Professor John Langbein suggests another explanation for judicial reluc-
tance to appoint neutral expert witnesses. 69 He argues that effective use of
court-appointed experts "presupposes early and extensive judicial involve-
ment in shaping the whole of the proofs" and that American judges rarely
have "detailed acquaintance with the facts of the case until the parties
present[ j their evidence at trial." 70 Professor Langbein speculates that with
65 Botter, supra note 61, at 76.
66 See Imwinkelried, supra note 36, at 566 (arguing that "there is little or ro
objective support for the assertion" that jurors attach too much weight to scientific
evidence and that "almost all the available data point to the contrary conclusion").
67 Van Dusen, A United States District Judge's Views of the Impartial Medical
Expert System, 32 F.R.D. 481, 512 (1962).
68 Other things being equal, one would expect 50% of the cases that go to verdict to
be decided for plaintiffs, and 50% for defendants. See Priest & Klein, The Selection
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1984). Extending this logic, if
testimony by court-appointed experts had no effect on jury verdicts, one would
expect the jury's verdict to agree with the court-appointed expert's testimony 50% of
the time. The finding of 63% agreement would seem on the surface to suggest that the
court-appointed expert's testimony has a slight effect on the outcome. To draw such
a conclusion would be incorrect, however, because we do not know how the cases
would have been decided without expert testimony. It is equally plausible that ajury
will agree with the court-appointed expert more than 50% of the time because the
expert is choosing to support the party who has the stronger case and is more likely to
win a jury verdict in any event.
69 Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823,
835-41 (1985) (comparing German and American practices with regard to expert
witnesses in civil cases).
70 Id. at 841.
HeinOnline -- 69 B.U. L. Rev. 502 1989
TOWARD INCENTIVE-BASED PROCEDURE
the rise of "managerial judging," the use of court-appointed experts may
also increase. 71
In my opinion, the problem is deeper than Langbein suggests. "Manage-
rial judging" and earlier judicial involvement are unlikely by themselves to
lead to increased utilization of court-appointed experts. Imagine a judge
determined to acquire the information necessary to decide whether to ap-
point a neutral expert; what should she search for? The problem is not
simply that judges lack information; they lack criteria for determining when
a case is appropriate for a court-appointed expert.
The confusion about when, if ever, courts should appoint an expert arises
out of a fundamental American skepticism about the value of neutral, objec-
tive expertise. 72 Most Americans do not believe that "neutral objective
experts" exist on any subject, and particularly not on scientific issues. 73 This
skepticism about expertise undermines the traditional rationale for court-
appointed experts.7 4 If every expert comes to court with "an axe to grind,"
then why add the court's expert, with his or her own partisan beliefs and
commitments, to those of the parties.
I do not agree with the prevailing skepticism in our culture about the value
of neutral expertise. While no one is without values and preconceptions, it
seems to me that experts picked by the court for their lack of bias must be
more neutral and objective than those hired by attorneys for their biases.
Nonetheless, I recognize that many judges are deeply concerned that all
experts come to court with "an axe to grind."
71 Id.
72 Contemporary American skepticism toward expertise becomes more evident if
we contrast our attitudes with those in Germany. The usual standard of proof in a
German civil case is "with a probability that approaches certainty." This reflects an
underlying assumption that objective truth exists and is reasonably ascertainable
through the judicial process. The same assumption apparently carries over into the
area of testimony by experts, Sachverstaendige, literally "those who understand a
thing." In cases where expert testimony is relevant, the court selects an expert from
a list drawn up in advance by governmental or industrial bodies. The litigants are free
to present testimony from an expert of their own who disagrees with the official
expert, but they rarely do. When they do, the court will often appoint a third expert
to resolve any disagreement. Langbein, supra note 69, at 839-40. Again, the underly-
ing assumption seems to be that knowledgeable people ought to share a common
understanding of reality. Contrast this with the typical American attitudes that you
can hire an expert to testify to anything you want on any subject.
73 See generally Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assess-
ment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988); Carter, The Bellman, The Snark, and the
Bio-hazard Debate, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 358 (1985).
74 For discussions of the problem of court appointed experts' partisan beliefs, see
Botter, supra note 61, at 60; Berry, Impartial Medical Testimony, 32 F.R.D. 481,
539-46 (1962).
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In the final section of this paper, I propose a rule that views the role of the
court-appointed expert in a new way. I believe that my proposal makes a
virtue of the fact that every expert inevitably brings his or her own biases
and points of view into the courtroom. It also attempts to articulate stan-
dards defining when judges should appoint expert witnesses. 75
B. Science Panels
The perception that on many issues scientific opinion is not uniform has
led to the view that courts should refrain from endorsing any one view by
appointing a single expert witness and to the suggestion that courts should,
instead, appoint apanel of scientists. The panel is intended to give the jury a
picture of the range and distribution of scientific opinion.7 1
A similar device, "scientific advisory committees," are commonly used in
the administrative process. These panels have been reasonably successful.
For example, one study found that, in states where medical advisory panels
are active in workers' compensation claims, all concerned reported "a high
degree of satisfaction."177 Why haven't science panels, used so successfully
in the administrative process, been more widely used in court?7 8 At least
three problems with using scientific expert panels in traditional litigation
come to mind.
First, adapting the scientific consensus panel to courtroom use poses some
procedural difficulties. One can imagine that a judge might appoint a group
71 For the moment, however, it should be noted that all experts seem to have a
point of view, which has traditionally been a powerful justification for not appointing
a single expert to testify with the implicit endorsement of the court.
76 Cf. Kaysen, An Economist as the Judge's Law Clerk in Sherman Act Cases, 12
A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 43, 46-47 (1958) ("There is also the possibility that the
view of any single man [sic] may suffer from unconscious biases and prejudices and
that a panel of two or three economists might do better .... ).
77 P. BARTH, RESOLVING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIMS: THE USE OF MEDICAL
PANELS 7 (Workers Compensation Research Institute 1985).
78 A few courts have experimented with science panels. See McGovern, Manage-
ment of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affecting Case
Management, 19 FORUM 1, 14 (1983) (citing systems using experts and expert panels
with moderate success). Regarding his use of science panels, Judge Weinstein notes
that:
In bench trials, I from time to time use a technique of swearing all the experts,
seating them at the table together with counsel and the judge and engaging them
in recorded colloquy under court direction. These discussions have sometimes
produced a more reasonable attitude by the experts and considerable narrowing
of disagreement among them.
J. Weinstein, supra note 24, at 22. Broader use of expert panels is advocated in
Wessel, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Socioscientific Dispute, 1 J.L. &
TECH. 1, 6-7 (1986).
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as an expert panel, or a special master, or even as a non-binding jury. 9 But it
is not clear how the group would function and present its conclusions in
court. A panel is a collegial body whose members discuss ideas and reach a
consensus. 80 In order to protect litigants' procedural rights, would these
deliberations need to take place in the courtroom with attorneys for the
parties present?8 1
A second obvious problem is presented by the need to determine who
should be appointed to the panel. If the science panel is intended to repre-
sent a microcosm of scientific opinion, its members must be selected by
persons with reasonable knowledge of the range of scientific opinion in a
particular field. This is less of a problem for an administrative agency such as
the EPA, which deals with issues of toxicology, epidemiology, and oncology
on an on-going basis, than it is for ajudge who may confront these subjects
only once in a career.
Even assuming these first two problems could be resolved (and I believe
that they could), a third problem with court-appointed science panels may
prove more intractable: cost. It is expensive to convene eight or ten highly-
qualified scientists. While a court-appointed science panel may have sub-
stantial value in a "big case," where the amounts at issue dwarf the expense
involved, it would be completely unfeasible to employ ad hoc science panels
in the thousands of toxic tort and medical malpractice cases that are now
pending. The economic costs associated with science panels reflect the
underlying scarcity of scientific talent. Organizations such as the National
Academy of Sciences and the EPA may be able to assemble an advisory
panel of ten or twelve of the country's top scientists to reach a consensus
judgment on generic issues; it would be almost impossible, however, to
assemble a comparable panel every time a technical case goes to a jury.
Science panels can be a practical solution to the problem of the partisan
expert only if Congress passes new statutory authority to consolidate cases
(including state court cases) into a single forum. 8 2
C. Administrative-Court Hybrids
The practical difficulties of managing science panels in case-by-case litiga-
tion have led to the idea that perhaps administrative bodies could develop
78 Various procedural devices for utilizing science panels in toxic tort litigation are
explored in Elliott, supra note 3, at 115-17.
80 See, e.g., Goldstein, The Scientific Basis for Policy Decisions, in EPIDEMIOL-
OGY AND HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT 12 (L. Gordis ed. 1988).
81 Cf. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (1982) (establishing
procedures for committees that advise officers and agencies in the executive branch,
among them a requirement that the public must be given advance notice of meetings
and the meetings must be open to them).
82 The ABA Mass Torts Commission is reportedly considering a recommendation
for greater consolidation of cases and expanded use of science panels.
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generic risk assessments for use in toxic tort cases. 83 I call this technique the
hybrid compensation system. Because courts and administrative agencies
each have distinct advantages and disadvantages, we should try to combine
the best of both systems . 4 One possibility is to use an administrative science
panel to develop generic risk assessments that can be introduced as evidence
in court, rather than constituting a separate panel to opine directly on the
issues in each individual case. Like the ad hoc science panels appointed by
judges for a particular case, administrative science panels can present the
judgment of scientists who represent a broader range of opinion than does
any one expert. But because the administrative panel addresses issues
generically rather than on a case-by-case basis, it may prove more feasible
than assembling a new science panel for each case.
A number of these hybrid arrangements already exist. 85 Epidemiological
studies by the Federal Center for Disease Control (CDC) have been accepted
by the courts as evidence and have become the mainstays of plaintiffs' cases
for toxic syndrome8 6 and swine flu.87 A recent statute requires the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to compile esti-
mates of the probability that persons exposed to radiation from atmospheric
testing of nuclear weapons will develop cancer.8 8 The 1986 amendments to
the "Superfund" statute require the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (the "ATSDR") to compile "toxicological profiles" on the
100 most significant hazardous substances.8 9 In essence, the ATSDR must
distill the scientific literature, define the health problems known to be caused
by hazardous chemicals, and determine the exposure levels that may cause
these problems. This amounts to generic expert testimony by a neutral
administrative science panel that may be admitted to guide the jury's consid-
eration of partisan expert testimony in individual cases. The ATSDR is also
83 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 4, at 1358-60; see also SUPERFUND SECTION 301(e)
STUDY GROUP, supra note 11.
84 For further discussion of the concept of hybrid compensation systems, see
Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable Injury,
and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REv. 781 (1988).
85 See Atkeson, Toxics Regulation and Products Liability: Decreasing Exposure in
the Workplace, Increasing Exposure in the Courts, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10418 (1983).
86 See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984);
Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983).
87 In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 508 F. Supp. 897, 907 (D.
Colo. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1983).
88 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 7, 96 Stat. 2049, 2059-60 (1983).
89 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. 99-499, Sec.
110(3)(A), 100 Stat. 1613, 1637 (1986). These "toxicological profiles" are to include
an "interpretation of available toxicological information and epidemiological evalua-
tions ... in order to ascertain the levels of significant human exposure ... and the
associated ... health effects." Id.
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granted discretionary authority to "perform health assessments" for
hazardous waste releases and "facilities where individuals have been ex-
posed." 90 This suggests that a trial judge could call in the ATSDR to
study plaintiffs who claim injury from exposure to hazardous wastes.9
It remains to be seen how useful generic risk assessment by administrative
agencies will prove to be. There are obvious difficulties with drawing con-
clusions from generic information in specific cases. In addition, administra-
tive agencies do not have a good record-at least in the regulatory
context-of making decisions based on "good science" rather than political
considerations. 92 Moreover, courts have been hostile and unreceptive to
administrative science panels in the past, even though such panels could aid
courts in their reviewing function by providing a neutral evaluation of
scientific and technical issues.9 3
While the development of administrative science panels to work in con-
junction with courts and juries holds some promise, they are obviously no
panacea. It remains unclear whether the full potential of hybrid compensa-
tion systems will be realized.
IV. APPROACH THREE: INCENTIVES
As an alternative, I propose the following model rule to supplement the
existing judicial exclusion and information enhancement strategies for con-
trolling expert testimony:
(1) In any case in which it is anticipated that expert testimony of a
scientific nature may be introduced, the expert shall write a report
stating his conclusions and summarizing the data and analysis consid-
ered in reaching those conclusions. This report and a description of the
expert's qualifications shall be produced to all other parties at the time
established by the court.
(2) Upon the motion of any party at or prior to the pretrial, or upon its
own motion at any time, the court shall determine whether expert
testimony offered or anticipated to be offered relies on principles,
techniques, or conclusions the validity of which would be subject to
substantial doubt in peer review by the scientific community.
90 Comprehensive Environmental Resource Conservation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. 9604(i)(6)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
91 For a case in which an ATDSR study played a crucial role in supporting a
successful motion for summary judgment by the defendants, see In re Paoli Railroad
Yard PCB Litigation, 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
92 Latin, supra note 73, at 89 n.3; R. CRANDALL & L. LAVE, THE SCIENTIFIC
BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 15 (1981).
91 See American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(stating that review of the revised ozone standard by EPA Science Advisory Board
("SAB") was not necessary, since SAB's role is merely "advisory"), cert. denied
sub non. American Petroleum Inst. v. Gorsuch, 445 U.S. 1034 (1982).
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(3) If the court finds substantial doubt as to the testimony of an expert, it
shall appoint a peer review expert learned in the relevant fields to testify
at trial concerning whether the principles, techniques, and conclusions
by the experts for the parties would be generally accepted as valid by
persons learned in the field. The fees for the court-appointed peer
review expert shall be taxed as costs.
The proposed peer review rule has three stages. In the first stage, the rule
requires that any party who contemplates introducing expert testimony shall
obtain a written report from the expert stating the substance and basis of the
conclusions..In the report, the expert must summarize the materials consid-
ered and the analysis that supports her conclusions. The report should
include (or refer to, if available elsewhere) all materials necessary to explain
the expert's analysis, including a description of any tests or other procedures
performed, the test results, and citations to the literature relied on by the
expert. The purpose of the report is to give the opposing party and the court
a fair summary of the expert's testimony and the basis for her conclusions.
The rule requires that a written summary of the expert's qualifications, such
as a curriculum vitae, shall accompany the report. If a party fails to produce
such a report, or if the report is incomplete or misleading, the court shall
impose appropriate sanctions, such as excluding the expert's testimony in
whole or in part.
Exchange of expert reports triggers the second stage of the rule. Any
party, or the court on its own motion, may initiate a peer review proceeding
to determine whether there would be "substantial doubt" among qualified
scientists concerning the basis for an expert's testimony. The "substantial
doubt" standard is not satisfied simply because experts for opposing parties
reach different conclusions. Experts frequently disagree because they have
been asked different questions, made different assumptions, or considered
different materials in reaching their conclusions. Additionally, on some
issues, the scientific community may regard more than one school of thought
as plausible. If several theories currently command widespread support, and
it is uncertain which (if any) will ultimately prove correct, the "substantial
doubt" standard would not necessarily be satisfied.
If, however, most qualified scientists regard a conclusion or theory as
speculative, unscientific, or unsupported, the "substantial doubt" standard
would be satisfied. Where one view on a scientific issue commands a strong
consensus, but small minorities hold dissenting views, the court should
make the jury aware of which scientists are speaking for themselves and
which are speaking for science as a collective enterprise. A "substantial
doubt" finding is essentially a conclusion by the court that there is probable
cause to believe that the conclusions offered would be regarded in peer
review as questionable, unscientific, or lacking significant scientific support.
A "substantial doubt" finding does not require that testimony be excluded
(as it would be under the judicial "screening" approach). The court does not
determine whether the expert's testimony is valid or invalid; rather, it
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determines whether the testimony is sufficiently in doubt that a neutral peer
review expert might help the jury determine the standing and scientific
acceptability of the expert's testimony. This approach does not exclude the
testimony of the person who believes that he is the new Galileo, but it does
require that the jury be told that the expert for one side stands virtually alone
against the prevailing consensus of scientific opinion. Judges should make a
"substantial doubt" finding whenever testimony by a neutral peer review
expert might help a jury evaluate testimony more objectively.9 4
Many people object to appointing a single expert to testify as a witness for
the court because all experts have their own views which, if presented with
the court's implicit imprimatur, may be given undue weight by ajury. While
it is undoubtedly true that an expert witness does not become either "objec-
tive" or "neutral" merely because she is court-appointed, the proposed rule
provides several answers to this objection. First, the problem is ameliorated
somewhat because the court asks the peer review expert to assess how the
scientific community would regard the analysis by the parties' experts, not
to present his or her own views on the merits of the controversy. To those
who would claim that it is impossible to distinguish between the expert's
personal opinion and the opinions of the scientific community, I would
answer that lawyers do something similar all the time in advising clients
about existing law as distinct from their personal view of what the law should
be. Second, at least where a "substantial doubt" finding has been made,
there is already a risk that the parties experts may mislead the jury as to the
status of scientific opinion. A court-appointed expert will provide a needed
corrective, even if her testimony is not a perfect representation of the range
of scientific opinion. Finally, a court-appointed expert's distinctive point of
view plays a useful role under the proposed rule. Because of the risk that the
court-appointed expert will be unfavorable to them, parties will have a
strong incentive to try to avoid having the court appoint a peer review
expert. Parties can do this by selecting experts whose testimony, while
favorable to their case, is not vulnerable to a "substantial doubt" finding.
Thus, the threat of the appointment of peer review experts may induce
lawyers to select experts closer to the mainstream of scientific opinion.
The court should base its decision whether to appoint a peer review expert
on the partisan experts' reports and other written submissions. The court
may also hear testimony from the experts themselves or from other scien-
tists concerning the expert's qualifications and the scientific validity of her
testimony. The proceeding to determine whether to appoint a peer review
expert should be held during the final preparations for trial, such as at the
final pre-trial conference, or even, in the courts' discretion, after an expert
has given his testimony. The decision to appoint a peer review expert should
be delayed as long as possible for two reasons. First, the incentive to
94 Of course, even if the "substantial doubt" standard is not satisfied, the court
would retain its general, discretionary power to name court-appointed witnesses.
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self-police experts will be greatest if a party is uncertain whether a particular
expert's testimony will trigger the court's appointment of a peer review
expert. Second, delaying the decision to appoint a peer review expert until
the eve of trial will conserve the court's time. A hearing on a motion to
appoint a peer review expert may consume substantial court (or a magis-
trate's or master's) time, because it requires "previewing" the scientific
controversies raised by expert testimony.
Because the decision whether to appoint a peer review expert should
come just before (or even during) trial, the court will generally not have
sufficient time to identify an appropriate person to serve as expert; nor will
the court-appointed peer review expert have time to prepare for trial. There-
fore, when a party files a motion asking the court to appoint a peer review
expert, he should also submit the names of two or more persons qualified
and willing to serve as court-appointed peer review experts. The court
should not be reluctant to select a party's nominee, provided that the court
determines that the nominee is knowledgeable and does not have ties to a
party that would preclude her from testifying as a neutral expert.
The court-appointed peer review expert's function is to explain to the jury
the scientific community's regard for the party-appointed expert's asser-
tions. It is not the function of the peer review expert to express an opinion on
the issues in the case. The judge should explain that the peer review expert is
not affiliated with either of the parties and that she was appointed by the
court to aid the jury in assessing the testimony of experts hired by the
litigants. The court-appointed peer review expert would testify and be sub-
ject to cross-examination in the same manner as would any other expert
witness, except that it may often be appropriate for the court to conduct the
initial examination of the peer review expert.
The proposed rule for court-appointed peer review experts builds on both
the judicial exclusion and the information enhancement strategies, but at-
tempts to go further. Like Frye and its progeny, the proposed rule focuses on
whether the expert's opinion has achieved general acceptance within the
scientific community. Like information enhancement strategies, however,
the proposed rule does not withhold information from the jury. Rather it
seeks to put debatable testimony into perspective by providing juries with
additional information to help them in evaluating testimony. Because the
"sanction" under the proposed rule is less extreme than under the Frye rule
or related doctrines, courts should be willing to invoke the proposed rule in
borderline or questionable cases where they would be reluctant to exclude
testimony outright.
The most important difference between the proposed rule for court-
appointed peer review experts and existing approaches, however, is that the
proposed rule aims to work on two levels at once. The rule works on one
level in cases in which the court appoints peer review experts to testify.
More importantly, the rule aims to improve the functioning of the system on
a second level by encouraging parties not to use experts whose testimony
would appear questionable to mainstream scientific opinion.
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This dual aspect characterizes and defines the incentive-based approach to
procedure. The idea behind incentive-based procedure is that "the most
effective kind of power is the power which need not be used to be effec-
tive."-9 Under the existing system, attorneys sometimes have strong incen-
tives to select experts representing the extremes in the range of scientific
opinion. The proposed rule does not preclude, but imposes a cost on select-
ing an expert whose views are outside the mainstream of scientific opinion.
Extreme expert testimony may damage a party's case if it provokes a court
to appoint a peer review expert who condemns the testimony as unscientific
and unsubstantiated by accepted scientific theories or techniques.
To perform effectively as an ex ante incentive, a rule must be announced
in advance so that litigants can consider it in formulating their strategies. The
rule must also present a credible threat of an unacceptable consequence. To
satisfy these criteria, it is not necessary to amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. It would be sufficient for a judge to announce in advance his or
her intention to name court-appointed witnesses in accordance with the
provisions of the proposed rule. Ideally, a court could issue a standing order
or local rule9 6 declaring this policy for all to see.
Whether the threat of testimony by peer review experts would be a
sufficiently powerful incentive to alter attorneys' choices of expert witnesses
remains to be seen. There are, however, some reasons for optimism. Many
experienced trial attorneys and judges believe that the surest way for an
attorney to lose ajury case is to appear to be trying to deceive or mislead the
jury. Experienced trial attorneys would not willingly take on the risk of
having the judge's expert tell the jury that the attorney's case depended on
an expert whose views were unscientific and rejected by most reputable
scientists.
The key idea behind the proposed rule is simple: judges are not in the best
position to affect the presentation of expert testimony in litigation; attorneys
are.
95 Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and
the Legislative Veto, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 125, 152.
96 At one time the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania had a rule somewhat similar to that proposed in the text. Under that
local rule, an impartial medical expert would be identified to the jury as a court
appointee only if the expert certified in his report that the proposed testimony of a
partisan expert was "so slanted that in the present state of medical science a
reasonable medical scientist could not accept it either as to diagnosis, causal connec-
tion or prognosis." Western District of Pennsylvania, U.S. District Court Rules,
Rule 5(III)(B) (1961), quoted in Gallagher v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 31 F.R.D. 36,
37-38 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
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